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Changing Tides in Music Licensing? BMI v. DMX 
and In re THP 
By Carly Olson* 
¶1  In cafés, restaurants, bars, and stores, music creates an ambience to keep customers 
happy.  But this music is not free.  Most businesses that play music must pay royalties to 
the copyright holders or else risk liability for copyright infringement.  Traditionally, 
proprietors have protected themselves by entering into blanket agreements with 
performing rights organizations (PROs), which give licensees the unlimited right to play 
any music from the PRO’s catalog in return for an annual fee.1 
¶2  Recently, however, one company that plays such background music has entered 
into a different kind of licensing agreement.  It makes direct payments to copyright 
holders to license music and then deducts those payments from its annual fee to the PRO.  
Last year this arrangement led to two lawsuits in the Southern District of New York 
which could significantly impact the music business:2  Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DMX, 
Inc.3 and In re THP Capstar Acquisition Corp.4 
¶3  The first case involves a dispute between Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), one of the 
two major PROs in the United States, and DMX, Inc. (DMX), a commercial music 
services provider (CMSP) that provides background music for public spaces.  The two 
companies disagreed over the fees for an adjustable-fee blanket license (AFB license), a 
method of payment that allows a licensee to reduce the fees it owes the PRO by licensing 
music directly from the copyright holder.5  Both parties agreed that DMX should pay 
BMI an annual “per-location rate,” but they had vastly different views of what the rate 
should be.  BMI requested $41.81 per location, while DMX proposed $11.32 per 
location.6 
¶4  The case In re THP covered largely the same issues as BMI v. DMX, but involved 
the other major PRO, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
(ASCAP).  In this case, DMX offered ASCAP the same general fee structure that BMI 
proposed.7  ASCAP contended that an AFB license was unreasonable and that it was not 
required to issue a license.8  Therefore, ASCAP refused to suggest a reasonable AFB 
 
* Carly Olson is a third-year student at Northwestern University School of Law.  She would like to thank 
her family, friends, professors, and peers for all of their support and assistance. 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Broad. Music, Inc. (In re AEI Music Network, Inc.), 275 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 
2001); United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 831 F. Supp. 137, 166–67 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
2 Ed Christman, Licensed to Ill: U.S. Appeals Court’s BMI Rate Decision Could Signal Other Changes for 
PROs, BILLBOARD, Sept. 18, 2010, at 8. 
3 726 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
4 756 F. Supp. 2d 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
5 BMI v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 355. 
6 Id. at 355, 357. 
7 In re THP, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
8 Id. at 539. 




license fee structure and instead offered two proposals:  a blanket license with no carve-
outs and a blanket license with a static carve-out.9 
¶5  An AFB license is essentially a blanket license, from which CMSPs can subtract a 
proportional credit reflecting the performances of the PRO’s music it has directly 
licensed.  CMSPs still have to contract with large PROs because it is not feasible for 
them to directly license a PRO’s entire catalog, which can consist of millions of musical 
works and hundreds of thousands of copyright holders.10  An AFB license allows CMSPs 
to protect themselves from liability for copyright infringement while still trying to save 
money by directly licensing music from specific copyright holders. 
¶6  This issue has arisen only recently because in past years blanket licenses with 
PROs were the only practicable way for CMSPs to license musical works.  It used to be 
too laborious and time-consuming for a CMSP to contact individual music publishers or 
copyright holders to attempt to directly license their works.  Now, however, it is 
relatively quick and easy to contact multiple businesses around the country.  
Technological advances allow CMSPs to directly license music and to keep track of how 
much directly licensed music it plays.  Therefore, AFB licenses are not only feasible in a 
way they were not before, but are also an attractive way for CMSPs to try to save money. 
¶7  The BMI v. DMX and In re THP courts came to conclusions that conform to the 
government’s model and further the government’s goal of maintaining reasonable music 
licensing fees.  These decisions provide a means by which CMSPs can directly license 
music from copyright holders and deduct the fees from their blanket licenses.  The 
decisions also recognize that the blanket fees BMI offered were unreasonable.11  This 
helps fulfill the original intent of the consent decrees under which BMI and ASCAP are 
allowed to operate:  to “provid[e] a mechanism for the setting of reasonable license fees 
in a unique market in which ASCAP [and BMI] indisputably exercise[] market power.”12  
BMI is resisting this decision in court, attempting to thwart the terms of its consent 
decree to retain its near monopoly on the music licensing industry.13 
¶8  In Part I, this Note examines the historical developments in music licensing that led 
to the BMI v. DMX and In re THP cases.  Part II examines how DMX sought direct 
licenses from copyright holders.  Parts III and IV discuss the recent BMI v. DMX and In 
re THP decisions, respectively.  Part V discusses the decisions’ potential future effects on 
the music licensing industry as well as other industries that use similar licensing 
practices.  Part VI concludes by examining BMI and ASCAP’s opposition to the 
decisions, explaining that the Second Circuit should uphold the decisions of the district 
court to conform with government intent. 
 
9 Id. 
10 See e.g., Search the Repertoire, BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., http://www.bmi.com/search/ (last visited Nov. 
14, 2011). 
11BMI v. DMX, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d at 359.  
12 In re THP, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
13 See, e.g., BMI Appeals DMX Rate-Court Decision, BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. (Aug. 24, 2010), 
http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/549016. 




I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
¶9  DMX considers itself an “international leader” in multi-sensory branding that has 
been “creating unforgettable brand experiences for commercial environments” since 
1971.14  This branding includes providing music for clients to play in their places of 
business.  DMX delivers music to customers by satellite transmission, disc, and 
electronically transmitted programming data.15  DMX has licenses with both BMI and 
ASCAP.16  DMX uses technology that allows it to accurately report music use and to 
directly license with publishers “representing a total of more than 7,000 catalogs.”17 
¶10  BMI and ASCAP are the two major PROs that license the public performance 
rights for most copyrighted music in the United States.18  They “grant[] licenses to music 
users, collect[] license fees from them, and distribute[] the royalties among [their] 
affiliated copyright holders.”19  BMI was founded in 1939 as a not-for-profit organization 
representing the owners of copyrighted music to issue non-exclusive licenses to music 
users.20  ASCAP was formed in 1914 as a means to enforce the copyrights for works 
performed for profit, which were too difficult for the individual copyright owners to 
manage.21  The two organizations have come to dominate the field of music licensing, 
meaning that nearly anyone who wishes to play music in public has to contract with 
both.22 
¶11  The U.S. government, concerned that this two-party control of music publishing 
could be anti-competitive, brought antitrust suits against each company in 1941.23  To 
settle both suits, the court approved consent decrees24 that allowed BMI and ASCAP to 
operate under regulations designed to limit the likelihood of the companies engaging in 
monopolistic behavior.25  The government believed that the “rate court” mechanism 
would protect bulk music users from PROs’ attempts to exert their market power in 
setting blanket licensing fees,26 foster competition, and further the antitrust goals of the 
consent decrees.27 
¶12  The consent decrees allow BMI and ASCAP to license music through non-
exclusive blanket licenses, which the Supreme Court has held is not per se invalid under 
 
14 About Us, DMX, http://www.dmx.com/about (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
15 BMI v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 364. 
16 See In re THP, 756 F. Supp. 2d. at 518, 541. 
17 Id. at 532. 
18 United States v. Broad. Music, Inc. (Music Choice IV), 426 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2005). 
19 In re AEI Music Network, Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2001). 
20 United States v. Broad. Music, Inc. (Music Choice II), 316 F.3d 189, 190 (2d Cir. 2003). 
21 United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 13-95 (WCC), 1993 WL 60687, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1993). 
22 See William Sloan Coats et al., Surfacing from the Depths: Submarine Issues in Copyright and Rights of 
Publicity Licensing, in UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 2008, at 195, 216–18 (PLI 
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 950, 2008); see also Chris 
Bosman, ASCAP, BMI, SESAC Hurting Musicians, PREFIX (Nov. 19, 2009, 7:19 PM), 
http://www.prefixmag.com/news/ascap-bmi-sesac-hurting-musicians/34969/. 
23 In re AEI, 275 F.3d at 171–72. 
24 Id. at 172; Music Choice IV, 426 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2005). 
25 In re AEI, 275 F.3d at 175. 
26 Id. at 176. 
27 Id. at 172–73. 




antitrust law.28  BMI and ASCAP have traditionally conducted business using such 
blanket licenses, which allow licensors access to the PRO’s entire catalog for a flat fee.  
ASCAP’s consent decree, effective since 1950, provides that, in the event that ASCAP 
and its customers cannot agree on reasonable license fees, a court could determine the 
rate.29  Since 1994, BMI has been subject to the same regulation.30  The goal of the rate 
court is to identify a rate that two similarly situated parties, operating willingly, would 
agree on in an arm’s-length transaction.31  To determine the rate, the rate court identifies 
a benchmark—a previous deal reached between similarly situated parties—and then 
contemplates differences between the parties in the instant case and those in the 
benchmark deal.32 
¶13  BMI’s consent decree places various restrictions on the company.  It requires BMI 
to make licenses of its music available to any applicant, affiliate, or broadcaster.33  It 
prohibits BMI from discriminating between similarly situated licensees and bars BMI 
from preventing the writers or publishers of a musical work from licensing their work 
directly.34  When BMI negotiated its agreements with CMSPs for blanket fees starting in 
2004, seventy-five percent of the CMSPs had been operating for years without a blanket 
fee agreement.35  This gave BMI bargaining power.  The first agreement BMI negotiated 
in 2004 was with Muzak, one of DMX’s fellow CMSPs.  Muzak had not had a negotiated 
blanket fee agreement with BMI since 1994.36  The agreement reached by BMI and 
Muzak accounted for the difference between the rates Muzak had been paying for the 
past decade and the rates BMI viewed as reasonable.37  This difference came to between 
$4.5 and 5.5 million.38  Instead of retroactively paying the difference, the parties simply 
made the future rates higher to make up for the past debt; the per-location rate had 
previously ranged between $14 and $15, but the 2004 agreement set each at $36.36.39  
This rate was understood to be a compromise between BMI and Muzak, but was not 
explicitly stated in the agreement.40 
¶14  BMI then offered the same rate to the other members of the CMSP industry, 
including DMX.41  BMI declared it was unwilling to negotiate the per-location rate of 
 
28 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979); see also Buffalo Broad. Co. v. 
Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 918 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that because 
there are feasible alternatives to blanket licenses, such as direct licensing, blanket licenses are not per se an 
unreasonable restraint on trade). 
29 In re AEI, 275 F.3d at 172. 
30 Music Choice IV, 426 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2005). 
31 See Music Choice II, 316 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2003). 
32 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 355, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
33 In re AEI, 275 F.3d at 171–72. 
34 Id. at 172. 
35 BMI v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
36 Id. at 358. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 358–59. 
39 Id.  The $36.36 rate was merely the $6 million annual fee Muzak had agreed to pay divided by the 
amount of locations Muzak had (165,000).  The license also provided for increased annual fees in the event 
that Muzak experiences growth. Id. 
40 Id. at 358–59 (“In fact, the $36.36 per-location figure in the BMI/Muzak 2004–2009 license is no more 
than an arithmetical allocation of the $30 million flat fee, and as an economic matter must be understood as 
including a significant component for the $4.5 to $5.5 million ‘retroactive’ claim.”). 
41 Id. 




$36.36 because to do so would violate its consent decree’s prohibition of discriminating 
between licensees similarly situated.42  In order to challenge the $36.36 rate, CMSPs 
would have to appeal to the rate court.  However, if they did so, BMI could exert its 
reserved right to seek retroactive payments for the period in which they had operated 
without a blanket agreement.43  The CMSPs could not realistically negotiate with BMI, 
and nearly all of them accepted the form agreement containing the $36.36 per-location 
rate set by Muzak’s agreement.44  In this way, BMI forced the rates for the entire CMSP 
industry up and inverted the purpose of the consent decree.  Instead of protecting CMSPs 
from BMI’s exerting its market force, the consent decree had become a restriction that 
forced the whole industry to pay the same increased rate. 
¶15  In 2001, the Second Circuit decided in United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc. (In re 
AEI Music Network, Inc.) that BMI’s consent decree required the company to issue an 
AFB license with a reasonable fee structure upon request.45  The purpose was to “check, 
to some degree, the market power of the BMI rights holder collective” by “plac[ing] an 
upper limit on the price that BMI can charge for the blanket license” because direct 
licensing would act as a market-based constraint on BMI.46  Despite this decision, and 
despite multiple requests for AFB licenses, BMI had not issued a single AFB license at 
the time that this case was decided.47 
II. DMX’S DIRECT LICENSING 
¶16  In 2005, after DMX had been purchased out of bankruptcy, the company found that 
the rates BMI and ASCAP were charging it were too high for the difficult economy and 
the competition in the CMSP industry.48  New competitors had entered the marketplace, 
such as music consultants and streaming Internet-based services, which caused both 
DMX’s fees and its revenues to decrease.49  Because the fees DMX pays PROs constitute 
one of the company’s largest costs of sale,50 DMX attempted to license performance 
rights directly from copyright holders to control its costs.51  It offered copyright holders 
an annual fee of $25 multiplied by the number of locations for which DMX provided 





45 In re AEI Music Network, Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 177 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen an applicant . . . requests a 
blanket license with a fee structure that reflects such alternative licensing, BMI must advise the applicant of 
the fee it deems reasonable . . . .  Failure to do so will empower the district court to set a reasonable fee.”). 
46 Memorandum of the United States on Decree Construction Issues at 2, BMI v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d 
355 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08 Civ. 216 (LLS)), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f257700/257736.pdf. 
47 Id. at 1–2. 
48 BMI v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
49 In re THP Capstar Acquisition Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 516, 527–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  DMX’s rates 
declined by twenty-five percent from July 2008 to September 2010. Id. at 528. 
50 Id. at 528. 
51 BMI v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 




the December 2010 trial, DMX had secured approximately 850 direct licenses covering 
over 7,000 catalogs, which accounts for thirty percent of the company’s programming.54 
¶17  For the direct licensing effort to pay off, DMX calculated that it needed to secure 
direct licenses with one or two of the four major music publishers.55  DMX realized that 
this would be difficult, as the practice of blanket licensing was an agreement the music 
licensing industry was accustomed and dedicated to, and most of the major publishers sat 
on the board of ASCAP.56  To overcome this obstacle, DMX decided to offer incentives:  
advances of fifty percent over what BMI and ASCAP had been paying the major music 
publishers for the music DMX played.57 
¶18  This approach worked to secure a direct license with Sony/ATV Music Publishing, 
Inc. (Sony), one of the four major music publishers.58  This agreement between DMX and 
Sony was an important factor in persuading other music publishers to enter into direct 
licenses with DMX.59  DMX also attempted to secure a direct license with another major 
publisher, Universal Music Publishing Group (Universal).60  Universal, however, 
informed BMI of the negotiations to leverage advances from BMI.61  Universal accepted 
BMI’s offer of a $1,875,000 guarantee for the years 2008–2010 and did not enter into a 
direct license agreement with DMX.62 
III. BMI V. DMX     
¶19  Because the court already declared in 2001 that BMI had to offer AFB licenses,63 
the issue in BMI v. DMX was not whether DMX is entitled to an AFB license, but what 
the basis is for the rate of such a license.64  Even though DMX already succeeded in 
licensing directly with several music publishers, it had not yet agreed how the fees it 
owed to BMI would be determined.  The two parties had very different ideas as to what 
constitutes a reasonable market rate to calculate the fees DMX owed.65  It was, therefore, 
the court’s duty, as declared in BMI’s consent decree, to determine a reasonable rate.  
The court noted at the outset of its discussion of the issues that, under its consent decree, 
BMI bore the burden of proof in establishing the reasonableness of the fees it proposed.66 
¶20  The parties agreed that DMX should owe BMI a per-location rate and that the AFB 
license should include three components:  (1) a “blanket fee,” the fee DMX would pay if 
it did not directly license any of BMI’s music it performs; (2) a “floor fee,” the lowest fee 
DMX could pay to BMI, even if it directly licensed all of BMI’s music; and (3) a “direct 
license ratio,” which determines the percentage of BMI songs that DMX played that it 
 
54 In re THP, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 528, 532. 








63 In re AEI Music Network, Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2001). 
64 BMI v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 355–56. 
65 Id. at 358, 362–63. 
66 Id. at 357. 




directly licensed.67  The parties disagreed, however, on what reasonable blanket and floor 
fees would be and how to calculate the direct license ratio.68 
A. Blanket Fee 
¶21  Each party proposed a different benchmark to establish the blanket fee.69  BMI 
argued that the blanket license agreement reached with Muzak in 2004 is the most 
appropriate benchmark,70 given DMX’s other competitors accepted the same rate in their 
blanket licenses.71  Therefore, since the goal of the rate court is to determine “the price 
that a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to in an arm’s length transaction,”72 
BMI argued that the price other CMSPs paid in their transactions with BMI represents the 
fair market value of the licenses.  Therefore, BMI declared that the benchmark rate 
should be $36.36 annually per location.  BMI also demanded to increase the annual per 
location rate by fifteen percent to compensate BMI for the additional cost it would incur 
and for the benefit DMX would gain under an AFB license instead of a blanket license.73  
DMX’s blanket fee should thus, BMI argued, be $41.81 annually per location.74 
¶22  The United States took the “unusual step” of submitting a memorandum on the 
issue of BMI’s proposed blanket fee increase for the “option value” of the AFB license 
while the case was still active.75  The memorandum declared that “[t]he United States 
believes that this proposed increased fee undermines the BMI Consent Decree.  BMI’s 
approach would deter users from engaging in direct licensing with rights holders—a 
critical component of the structures created under the decree.”76  The government further 
asserted that agreeing to BMI’s proposed “option value premium” for the AFB license 
would subvert the consent decree as well as In re AEI Music Network, Inc. by making 
directly licensing performance rights economically impractical for BMI licensees.77  The 
government clearly opposed the increased fee BMI advocated. 
¶23  The court, examining the $41.81 blanket fee proposed by BMI, found that the 
competing CMSPs “had no realistic opportunity freely to negotiate the future fees for 
their licenses,” and, therefore, that the $36.36 fee they agreed to did not really reflect fair 
market value.78  Therefore, the blanket agreement between BMI and Muzak, as well as all 
the agreements reached pursuant to that agreement, were “not reliable benchmarks” to 
use in determining DMX’s blanket fee.79  Instead, the court found that DMX’s proposal 
of using its direct licenses as a benchmark was appropriate because the 550 direct 
 
67 Id. at 355–56. 
68 Id. at 356, 364. 
69 Id. at 357. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Music Choice II, 316 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
73 BMI v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 357. 
74 Id. 
75 Memorandum of the United States on Decree Construction Issues, supra note 46, at 1. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 2. 
78 BMI v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
79 Id. 




licenses DMX acquired were “sufficiently representative of the performance rights BMI 
provides through its blanket licenses.”80  The court therefore found that $25 per location 
annually was an appropriate benchmark for the blanket fee,81 and that the blanket fee 
should be $10.25 more than the floor fee.82 
B. Floor Fee 
¶24  As the court explained, “[t]he Floor Fee represents the value to DMX of the portion 
of the [AFB license] that is independent of the value of the music performing rights.”83  
This fee remains constant, no matter how much of the BMI catalog that DMX has 
directly licensed.84  In determining the floor fee, the court attempted to ensure that BMI 
would not lose money by administering an AFB license for DMX.85 
¶25  Both BMI and DMX agreed that the floor fee should include the PRO’s overhead 
costs.86  The rate for the overhead costs was an issue of contention, however; BMI 
wanted to use its domestic rate of 17% and DMX wanted to use the 11.7% rate BMI had 
announced in a press release in 2008, which included international performances.87  The 
court found that because this case involved domestic performances, and because BMI 
monitors and distributes the license fees for domestic performances, the higher rate was 
appropriate.88  Thus, the court included 17% of BMI’s $36.36 per-location rate, or $6.18, 
in the floor fee for overhead costs.89 
¶26  The court agreed that DMX’s AFB license would be more expensive for BMI to 
administer than a regular blanket fee.90  The court undertook the duty to determine how 
much of those increased costs should be added to the floor fee.  Despite DMX’s 
objections that the increased costs were unproven, the court accepted BMI’s estimates for 
the additional cost BMI would incur as a result of the AFB license.91 
¶27  The district court divided the incremental costs into two groups:  the one-time costs 
required to set up the AFB license and the regular costs associated with administering the 
AFB license.92  The court ruled that DMX should be completely responsible for the latter 
 
80 Id. at 360. 
81 Id. at 361. 
82 In determining the appropriate blanket fee, the court ruled that ten percent of the incremental costs, or 
$0.25, should be included in the per-location blanket fee for the “return on investment in the incremental 
costs.” Id. at 364.  It also found that the $10 “music fee” DMX proposed should be included in the blanket 
fee. Id. 
83 Id. at 361.  The value “includes the convenience of gaining access to the entire BMI repertoire in one 
license, the immediate right to access new BMI works, and protection against copyright infringement.” Id. 
at 361–62. 
84 Id. at 355. 
85 Id. at 362–63. 
86 Id. at 362. 
87 Id.  BMI applies this 17% overhead rate to each of its commercial music service industry licenses. Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 364. 
90 Id. at 362. 
91 Since BMI had not administered any AFB licenses at the time, the estimates submitted were sufficient 
because they expressed BMI’s costs associated with administering per-program licenses in the television 
industry (which also involves direct licensing). Id. 
92 Id. 




costs, but should only be responsible for its share of the former costs.93  BMI calculated 
the costs associated with implementing systems to administer the AFB license to be 
$339,875.94  But since other CMSPs are likely to use these systems in the future, the 
court found that “[c]harging all the initial costs to DMX would be unfair.  Simply being 
the first licensee to take advantage of the [AFB license] . . . should not require DMX to 
bear all the developmental costs associated with it.”95  Instead, it found that the costs of 
developing the AFB license system should be spread over all the licensees who take 
advantage of the AFB license.96  Since it is impossible to determine how much of the 
initial implementation costs will be attributable to DMX before they are incurred, the 
court found it reasonable for DMX to bear the percentage of the implementation costs 
that corresponded to its market share of CMSP locations.97  The court calculated that this 
amounted to a $0.10 annual per-location fee for implementation costs.98 
¶28  As stated above, the court declared that DMX should pay the routine costs 
necessary to administer its AFB license.99  The court accepted the bulk of BMI’s 
estimates of the routine expenses associated with administering the AFB license.100  The 
court determined the routine costs to be $2.38 per location.101  The floor fee that the rate 
court determined comprised $6.18 for overhead costs, $0.10 for implementation costs, 
and $2.38 for routine costs, for a total of $8.66.102  The court set the blanket fee at $18.91, 
adding $10.25 to the floor fee.103  This was significantly less than BMI’s proposed 
blanket fee (which was $41.81), but more than DMX’s proposed blanket fee (which was 
$11.32).104 
IV. IN RE THP 
¶29  There were two issues at play in In re THP:  (1) whether ASCAP was required to 
grant DMX an AFB license, and (2) what constituted a reasonable rate structure for their 
agreement. 
 
93 Id. at 362–63. 




98 The court found that DMX’s market share of CMSP locations was approximately 16.6%. Id. at 364.  
BMI estimates the initial costs at $339,875, arguing DMX should pay for $56,419.25 of the implementation 
costs (16.6% of $339,875). Id. 
99 Id. at 362. 
100 The court said that the $10,000 BMI claimed it would incur for travel would be used for industry 
conventions and publisher meetings, and should thus not be included. Id. 
101 Id. at 364.  These costs will be incurred by BMI’s Licensing, Performing Rights, IT, and Operations 
Departments. Id. at 362.  BMI estimated that the Licensing and Performing Rights Departments would 
incur $151,000 in routine costs and the IT and Operations Departments would incur $37,073 in annual 
costs. Id. 
102 Id. at 364. 
103 Id. 
104 There was also a determination of the direct license ratio needed to calculate fees, but an examination of 
the disagreements surrounding that factor is not pertinent to this Note. See id. at 364–67. 




¶30  DMX requested an AFB license from ASCAP at the same time it did so from 
BMI.105  It proposed a rate structure nearly identical to that deemed reasonable and 
adopted by the court in BMI v. DMX.106  DMX suggested the same benchmark Judge 
Stanton adopted in that former case.107  Unlike BMI, however, ASCAP refused to suggest 
a reasonable fee for an AFB license.108  It argued that an AFB license is not a reasonable 
fee structure “because no willing seller would ever offer such a license,” and, therefore, 
ASCAP should not be required to offer it.109 
¶31  Instead, ASCAP requested a blanket license that charged DMX a flat fee of 
$15,677,777 for June 2005 to December 2009 and $49 per location for January 2010 to 
December 2012.110  The court found this unacceptable for several reasons.  First, it found 
that a reasonable licensing fee would have to consider DMX’s “well-developed direct 
licensing program”111 and that an AFB license was not only appropriate, but also 
justified.112  It also noted that DMX had shown that such a license would further the 
government’s original goal in granting ASCAP a consent decree by adding competition 
to the marketplace.113  Finally, the court found that the rates proposed by ASCAP were 
“far above any yet paid by a licensee” and unreasonable.114 
¶32  The court deemed ASCAP’s second proffered option, a blanket license with a static 
carve-out, to be unacceptable.115  ASCAP proposed that DMX pay a flat fee of 
$3,420,606 per year for the period from June 2005 to December 2009, less direct 
licenses, plus $25,000 per year for “additional administrative expense[s].”116  For January 
2010 to December 2012, ASCAP proposed a $49 per location annual blanket rate with a 
$230,000 carve-out credit each year plus an administrative charge of $25,000 per year.117  
ASCAP derived the $49 rate, similar to BMI’s proposal in BMI v. DMX, from an 
agreement with Muzak; as in the previous case, the court found that the Muzak 
agreement was “not a reliable benchmark.”118 
¶33  The court noted that the proposed shift from the 2005–2009 fee structure to the 
2010–2012 fee structure was highly suspect.  The switch coincided suspiciously with 
DMX’s entry into an agreement with DirecTV to take over the satellite television 
company’s music channels, which raised DMX’s locations from 70,000 to 95,000.119  
The increase in locations would have brought the per-location rate below the flat fee per-
location rate in 2010, meaning that ASCAP would not make as much money as it would 
if it charged per location.  The court observed that “ASCAP simply abandons the flat fee 
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when it no longer benefits from it and proposes a different method of calculating an 
annual fee for this latter period.”120 
¶34  The court also found the proposal unreasonable because “it [did] not allow DMX to 
reduce its payments to ASCAP based on the proportion of directly licensed music that it 
performs.”121  If allowed, this would remove any incentive for DMX to enter direct 
licenses because any time DMX enters into a new direct licensing agreement it will be 
paying more in total licensing fees.122  ASCAP’s proposal would have forced DMX to 
either reduce the amount of music it directly licenses below the ASCAP-granted credit or 
not have an ASCAP blanket license at all.123 
¶35  ASCAP also failed to provide evidence supporting the $25,000 annual 
administrative costs fee and, in fact, “did no formal analysis or study to arrive at th[at] 
figure.”124  The court found ASCAP’s proposals “extraordinarily aggressive”125 and 
“strongly anti-competitive.”126  Instead, the court opted to accept DMX’s proposal, 
referring to BMI v. DMX:  “[I]t is noteworthy that BMI did not contest that its licensing 
fee arrangement with DMX should be structured in a manner very similar to this.  Also, 
Judge Stanton recently approved this structure in setting the blanket license fee that DMX 
owes to BMI.”127  The court noted that Judge Stanton’s judgment on issues similar to 
those present in BMI v. DMX affirmed the reasonableness of DMX’s proposal in In re 
THP.128 
V. FUTURE EFFECTS 
¶36  This section examines the effects these decisions may have.  It discusses the 
potential positive and negative effects on current industry players, as well as the effects 
on outside industries, and the potential they create for new industries. 
A. Negative Effects for Rights Holders 
¶37  In a press release on its website, BMI announced that it had filed an appeal on 
behalf of its songwriters, composers, and music publishers.129  The release asserts that the 
decision would cause BMI’s copyright holders to lose “more than half of their income 
from DMX.”130  It characterizes the fees established by DMX’s direct licenses as “deeply 
discounted,” asserting that the market rate for both BMI and ASCAP before the decision 
was $77 per location.131  BMI, a not-for-profit company, declares that more than eighty-
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seven percent of all the fees paid to BMI go to the affiliated copyright owners.132  The 
overarching theme of the press release is that the decision reached in BMI v. DMX will 
result in rights holders receiving a fraction of what they previously received for the right 
to perform their works.  Some media outlets estimate that “the decision could cost BMI 
songwriters and publishers about $9 million per year, as well as $17 million in retroactive 
adjustments.”133  ASCAP stated in its 2010 Annual Report that it is appealing the district 
court decision.134 
B. Positive Effects for Rights Holders 
¶38  Despite claims to the contrary, this decision may benefit rights holders.  DMX’s 
general counsel claims that direct licensing “presents an opportunity for [music] 
publishers—and the writers they represent—to receive greater royalties through DMX’[s] 
increased use of their musical compositions.”135  Since DMX aims “to construct 
programs that rely heavily on music covered by its direct licenses,” direct licensors are 
likely to experience increased royalties from DMX due to increased numbers of 
performances.136 
¶39  DMX’s general counsel also touts the direct licenses’ transparency, which allows 
licensors to see exactly how many times DMX has performed any given song, as well as 
the resulting royalty payments.137  Many users have criticized PROs’ lack of transparency 
because the PROs are unable to offer such an accurate representation of the exact number 
of times a song has been performed for purposes of royalty calculation.  BMI describes 
its method for determining how frequently commercial radio plays affiliates’ music as 
such: 
All licensed stations are requested to log performances for a three-day period 
each year, with different stations logging each day of the year.  This sample is 
then factored to create a statistically reliable projection of all feature 
performances on all commercial music format radio stations throughout the 
country.  In addition to the sample, BMI includes data provided by proprietary 
pattern-recognition technology, which identifies performances from any source 
containing audio, achieving extraordinary accuracy, even in high-noise 
environments, after detecting audio for as little as one to two seconds.138 
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¶40  BMI then calculates a “unique royalty rate” for each work using the licensing fees 
collected from the radio stations that performed that work and the amount of times the 
work was performed on the stations.139  BMI calculates royalties for television 
performances using “a census of program information from music cue sheets and 
performance information provided to BMI by BMI television licensees, the TV Data 
Corporation, and other qualified sources.”140  The company calculates a “unique royalty 
rate” for television as well, “based upon the license fees available . . . in combination 
with the duration of the performance, the weighted royalty value for each usage type and 
television audience measurement data provided by Nielsen Media Research for each 
program aired on that network.”141  For sources that it does not monitor, BMI states that it 
may distribute the fees it collects “against performances from a source or sources where 
sufficient data is available.”142  BMI may add or remove a distribution source that was 
previously unmonitored “if the availability of accurate performance data changes.”143 
¶41  To keep track of licensed performances, ASCAP conducts a “census survey,” 
counting performances in a medium, so long as “the cost of collecting and processing 
accurate performance information is a low enough percentage of the revenues generated 
by that medium.”144  ASCAP conducts census surveys of major television stations, 
general entertainment cable networks, live concerts, and CMSPs.145  When the cost of a 
census survey is too great, ASCAP conducts a “sample survey designed to be a 
statistically accurate representation of performances in a medium.”146  Sample surveys 
are designed to account for “[a]ll times of the day, all days of the year, every region of 
the country and all types and sizes of stations.”147  ASCAP surveys in proportion to the 
amount of fees a licensee pays; the more a station pays ASCAP in licensing fees, the 
more (proportionately) it is sampled.148  DMX, on the other hand, gives copyright holders 
counts of each time a given work was played.149  With these direct counts, copyright 
holders can be certain they are receiving royalties for each and every performance of their 
work. 
¶42  The payment schedule DMX offers is also preferable to that which BMI and 
ASCAP currently use for their blanket licensing.  BMI distributes royalties to writers and 
publishers quarterly;150 however, “BMI does not distribute payments to its affiliates for 
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performance dates.”151  ASCAP distributes royalty checks eight times a year.152  ASCAP 
states that it has worked to quicken the process of domestic royalty payments so that 
copyright holders receive royalty payments “approximately six months after a 
performance quarter.”153  In contrast, DMX accounts to publishers and writers for its 
direct licensed works quarterly, forty-five days after the end of each quarter.154  It goes 
without saying that copyright holders would prefer to receive royalties sooner rather than 
later, and, thus, DMX’s method is the preferred one for them. 
C. Negative Effects on PROs and Positive Effects on CMSPs 
¶43  These two recent decisions will definitely affect PROs such as BMI and ASCAP.  
Understandably, PROs dislike these decisions because such decisions decrease the fees 
PROs receive from CMSPs.  The court’s decisions also allow other CMSPs to seek AFB 
licenses, which will further decrease the amount of fees BMI and ASCAP receive. 
¶44  The amount a PRO makes under a finding such as Judge Stanton’s is significantly 
lower than that which it made from CMSPs previously.  As discussed above, under 
BMI’s standard blanket license agreement, for instance, it would receive approximately 
$36.36 per location from a CMSP.155  If BMI were to have its way in determining the 
AFB license, it would have received $41.81 per location from DMX.156  Yet, in light of 
Judge Stanton’s decision, the most it will ever receive from DMX is $18.91 per location 
(the blanket fee).157  So, theoretically, the most BMI can make now from DMX is fifty-
two percent of what it received previously.  Given that DMX had already directly 
licensed with approximately 5,500 rights holders at the time of the trial, the blanket fee is 
certain to be reduced further, so BMI will not even recover fifty-two percent in 
practice.158  Many CMSPs, observing this result, may seek AFB licenses without directly 
licensing at all, as they will be able to spend approximately half of what they had 
previously for PRO licenses without exerting any extra effort. 
¶45  At the time of the trial, two other CMSPs had already requested an AFB license.159  
Music industry specialists expect that many more CMSPs will request similar AFB 
licenses from PROs.160  Other industries, such as local television and commercial 
broadcast radio, have already requested AFB licenses as well.161 
¶46  Based on the court’s analysis of the agreements BMI entered into pursuant to the 
2004 Muzak agreement, CMSPs who continue contracting with BMI using the traditional 
blanket license may also look to negotiate for a lower annual per-location fee which more 
accurately reflects fair market value.162  The court’s decision in BMI v. DMX may 
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encourage CMSPs to challenge the form licenses offered by BMI in rate court, whereas 
previously they had no realistic option but to accept the form agreement modeled on that 
entered into with Muzak.163 
D. Positive Effects on PROs 
¶47  Despite the negative effect these decisions may have on the fees PROs receive, 
these decisions may provide PROs some benefits.  For instance, Trusonic, a small CMSP 
that also deals in direct licensing, refused to “pay ASCAP anything for locations that only 
play music within the ASCAP repertory that Trusonic has directly licensed from 
publishers, or that play no ASCAP music.”164  In light of these two decisions, which 
assert that PROs should at least receive a floor fee, Trusonic would not be able to simply 
refuse to pay ASCAP anything. 
¶48  This idea of carve-out licensing “could potentially be applied to public performance 
areas beyond in-store play, such as terrestrial radio.”165  If radio stations were to directly 
license with copyright holders, they may opt to purchase the performance rights for hit 
songs they play frequently.  This would decrease the performance fees CMSPs pay 
PROs, as those fees would be deducted from the blanket fee. 
E. Effects on Radio and Songwriters 
¶49  If radio stations were to begin direct licensing with copyright holders, it could have 
varying effects on songwriters.  Radio stations might play the songs they directly license 
more frequently, hoping to reduce the fees owed to PROs, which could lead to decreased 
diversity in the songs played on radio stations.  This would be particularly likely if radio 
stations directly licensed for artists’ complete catalogs.  One artist would likely be played 
repeatedly, leaving less airtime for artists who are not directly licensed.  On the other 
hand, if lesser-known artists were willing to directly license performance rights to radio 
stations at discounted rates to gain entry into the radio market, that could promote new 
artists and add to the diversity of music played on radio stations. 
F. New Industries 
¶50  Other sub-industries may also evolve to service the needs of the burgeoning direct 
licensing system.  For instance, DMX hired Music Reports, Inc. (MRI), a company which 
specializes in “high-volume music license administration,” to help in the development of 
its direct licensing campaign.166  MRI was founded in 1989 with the aim “to help radio 
and television broadcasters take advantage of the per-program license available under the 
PRO consent decrees.”167  MRI identified the publishers whose works were most often 
played by DMX and developed a generic direct license agreement that would help DMX 
avoid in-depth individual negotiations with publishers and to negotiate and administer 
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deals en masse.168  These decisions will allow companies such as MRI to develop to meet 
the changing needs of CMSPs and others seeking AFB licenses. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶51  BMI vehemently opposes the decision reached by the court in BMI v. DMX, and 
has already filed an appeal with the Second Circuit.169  The argument BMI has offered 
against the decision is that it “ignores the long history of [PRO] licensing agreements in 
the background music industry.”170  BMI argues that because PROs have traditionally 
contracted for performance rights for CMSPs using blanket licenses, it should always 
stay that way.  The company is demanding deference due to the powerful position it has 
held in the CMS industry.  However, that is exactly what the government has been trying 
to combat since 1941, when it filed antitrust suits against BMI and ASCAP. 
¶52  In its memorandum on this case, the government stated that “[t]he United States 
supported blanket carve-out licenses in [In re] AEI because they check, to some degree, 
the market power of the BMI rights holder collective,” creating a competitive constraint 
more realistic than the court’s ratemaking power.171  Allowing music users to directly 
license from copyright holders places a limit on how high a fee PROs can charge for their 
blanket licenses because “[i]f the [PRO] collective charged more for a blanket license 
than users would pay if they licensed directly, users would forego a blanket license from 
[the PRO].”172  Thus, direct licensing creates a more competitive market. 
¶53  BMI’s attempt to combat CMSPs from opting for AFB licenses was to increase the 
blanket fee for AFB licenses.173  The government worried that such an “option value 
premium” would work against BMI’s Consent Decree and the decision in In re AEI, 
taking away constraints on the PRO’s market power because “[t]he greater the ‘option 
value premium,’ the fewer licensees will find the carve-out license mandated by [In re] 
AEI to be economically viable.”174 
¶54  Both BMI and ASCAP took ethically questionable steps in attempting to thwart 
DMX’s direct licensing campaign.  The CEO of ASCAP, John LoFrumento, attempted to 
dissuade both Sony and Universal from entering into AFB licenses with DMX.175  Sony 
signed with DMX, but Universal used DMX’s offer as leverage to secure from BMI a 
nearly $2 million “guarantee” in royalty payments for agreeing not to directly license 
with DMX.176  BMI also strong-armed some music publishers into refusing to renew their 
direct licenses with DMX.  Only fourteen of seventy-eight publishers have refused to 
renew their direct licenses with DMX.177  BMI contacted three of those fourteen who 
controlled significant catalogs, telling one publisher that “if it renewed its direct license 
agreement with DMX, BMI would force [the publisher] to repay BMI the payments BMI 
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had made to it during the direct license period.”178  The extralegal actions taken by BMI 
to prevent direct licensing demonstrates both the fear that PROs have of the change in 
licensing and their acknowledgement that the law is not on their side on this issue.179 
¶55  The BMI v. DMX and In re THP decisions further the government’s goals of 
creating a competitive marketplace within CMS licensing and checking the market power 
of PROs like BMI and ASCAP.  Creating a competitive market for CMS licensing will 
force PROs to compete for customers in a way they have not before experienced.  This 
competition will force the PROs to lower their blanket fees and increase the transparency 
of their operations to make licensing an attractive option to customers.180 
¶56  As unpopular as the decision may be with PROs, it is not improper.  It is merely a 
shift away from the traditional method of blanket licensing, one that was set in motion 
when the government first instituted antitrust suits against BMI and ASCAP in 1941. 
¶57  When the BMI v. DMX case goes to the Second Circuit on appeal, the court should 
find that the district court was correct in not granting BMI the $41.81 per-location rate it 
requested, which represented the per-location rate determined by Muzak’s 2004 blanket 
fee negotiation plus fifteen percent for the “option value” of the AFB license.181  As the 
blanket license fee is the result of a misuse of BMI’s consent decree and the high option 
value premium would deter CMSPs from seeking AFB licenses, granting the blanket fee 
BMI seeks is impermissible.  This is why the Second Circuit should uphold the bulk of 
the district court’s decision.  Though certain figures may need to be reconsidered, the heft 
of the decision is well founded and furthers the government’s interests in combating 
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